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ABSTRACT 
The present study investigated the extent to which thinking style 
predicted paranormal belief. To achieve this, Belief in Science 
indexed rational thinking, whilst cognitive-perceptual measures 
(reality testing, emotion-based reasoning and jumping to 
conclusions) indexed intuitive thinking. Additionally, 
relationships between thinking style related variables and 
specific facets of paranormal belief were explored. Past 
research has found positive correlations between intuitive 
thinking styles and belief in the paranormal. In contrast, negative 
correlations have been observed between rational thinking style 
and belief in the paranormal (Aarnio and Lindeman, 2005; 
Pennycook et al., 2012; Irwin and Young, 2002). A convenience 
sample of 278 participants completed an online questionnaire. 
Pearson’s correlations and a multiple regression analysed the 
collected data. Consistent with the hypotheses, the results 
yielded showed a positive relationship between intuitive thinking 
styles and belief in the paranormal, whilst rational thinking styles 
were found to negatively correlate with paranormal belief. 
Generally, correlations across separate facets of paranormal 
belief were consistent (ghosts, superstition, ESP, PK, astrology 
and witchcraft) with the exception of religion and aliens. Based 
on the findings of the study, future research should consider 
building on the implications and limitations of the present study.  
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The purpose of the present study is to look at whether thinking styles predicted 
paranormal belief (PB) and the extent of the relationship between them, as well as 
exploring how the relationship varies as a function of the variables.  
 
Background of Paranormal Belief 
 
Advancements in science and technology have been thought to be one of the 
reasons behind the triumphant nature of rationality over paranormal and superstitious 
beliefs (Mauss, 1972). Despite this, paranormal beliefs are seemingly widespread in 
Western culture with more than a third of American’s claiming to believe in certain 
aspects of paranormal beliefs (also known as magical or superstitious beliefs; Tobacyk 
and Milford, 1983), such as psychic powers, extrasensory perception (ESP) and alien 
visitations (Rice, 2003). There is a lack of conceptual clarity and a limited amount of 
definitions that encapsulate paranormal beliefs within scientific literature, with some 
researchers describing them as limits in an individuals’ cognitive processing 
(Shweder, 1977), ideas founded on ignorance (Padgett and Jorgenson, 1982) and 
conventionally invalid casual beliefs (Brugger and Graves, 1997), which could be 
attributable to the multidimensional nature of paranormal beliefs (Tobacyk and Milford, 
1983).  
 
Although there is no single consensus as to what constitutes as paranormal 
belief, it can be referred to a collection of wide-ranging ideas involving psi, superstition 
and telekinesis (Lindeman and Svedholm, 2012). An underlying definition explains 
them as beliefs that are beyond the analytical thinking capacity of humans; going 
against all the laws of nature (Chou and Chang, 2013). Research has been centered 
around beliefs in paranormal agents such as witches, ghosts and human paranormal 
abilities for instance, ESP, telepathy or psychokinesis (PK) (Rice, 2003). However, in 
a great deal of scientific literature, the separate facets that constitute paranormal belief 
are usually grouped together under one umbrella term of ‘paranormal belief’; rather 
than looking at the correlates between each singular facet and the differing thinking 
styles.  
 
Thinking Styles 
 
When attempting to explain paranormal beliefs, research has consistently 
reported a link with cognitive and decision-making biases which may predispose an 
individual to believe in paranormal phenomena (Irwin, 2009). Several studies have 
linked the two variables together, with small yet consistent significant positive 
correlations being noted (Aarnio and Lindeman, 2005; Irwin and Young, 2002). When 
broadly defined, cognition refers to the mental activities that are associated with the 
processing of information, including thinking and perception (French and Wilson, 
2007). Dual-processing theories have put forward two types of information processing 
styles (Gold and Gold, 2014; Ross et al., 2016; So et al., 2016; Norris and Epstein, 
2011; Pacini and Epstein, 1999). These are: intuitive (also known as experiential) and 
rational (also known as analytical) thinking styles which operate within different rules 
(Chou and Chang, 2013). Intuitive thinking styles are rooted in a cognitive processing 
system that is holistic, rapid and largely preconscious with personal experience being 
regarded as the main tool in processing information. This contrasts with rational 
thinking that is much slower, analytical, logical and conscious (Norris and Epstein, 
2011; Pacini and Epstein, 1999). Belief in paranormal phenomena is associated with 
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an over-reliance on intuitive as opposed to rational thinking (Irwin, 2009; Pennycook 
et al., 2012; Stanovich and West, 1998), with the conclusion being draw that believers 
in the paranormal exhibiting a deficit in cognitive processing. This is explained by the 
‘cognitive deficit hypothesis’ (Irwin, 2009) which suggests that individuals who are 
prone to belief in the paranormal lack the skills and abilities associated with ordinary 
cognition (van Elk, 2017).  
 
Previous research has found that individuals with an intuitive thinking style are 
more likely to believe in the paranormal. This sentiment is supported by studies which 
have demonstrated negative correlations between rational thinking and paranormal 
beliefs (Aarnio and Lindeman, 2005; Irwin and Young, 2002); thus illustrating the link 
that exists between the differing thinking styles and belief in the paranormal. Recent 
research has followed suit with empirical evidence from Lindeman and Aarnio (2006) 
who found that high intuitive and low rational thinking styles were important predictors 
of belief in the paranormal; noting that there is a heavy reliance on intuitive thinking 
within believers of paranormal phenomena. This sentiment is further echoed by 
Pennycook et al., (2012) who found that individuals who rejected an intuitive style of 
thinking were the ones who were more likely to reject paranormal beliefs. Pennycook 
et al., (2012) suggested that the reason behind the decreased levels of paranormal 
belief in analytically orientated individuals is due to the fact that many paranormal 
facets such as black magic and mind reading are counterintuitive; meaning that they 
are incongruent with the naturalistic worldview that some individuals hold (Atran and 
Norenzayan, 2004).  
 
Thinking Styles and Perceptual Measures 
 
The observable link between the concepts of thinking styles and cognitive-
perceptual measures allows rational and intuitive thinking styles to be distinguished 
between one another. Scales composed of cognitive-perceptual measures have been 
used in past research (Irwin et al., 2012a, 2013, 2014) such as the Cognitive Biases 
Questionnaire for Psychosis (CBQp; Peters et al., 2010) and the Belief in Science 
Questionnaire (BIS; Farias et al., 2013), which allow the discrimination between the 
two modes of thinking styles. The CBQp highlights deficits in cognitive biases which 
paranormal believers are observed to have an increased proneness to. This is 
supported by the cognitive deficit hypothesis (Irwin, 2009), with a higher score in the 
CBQp representing deficits in cognitive biases, which in turn are linked with an intuitive 
style of thinking. For instance, deficits in reality testing are said to steer individuals 
towards an intuitive style and away from a rational style of thinking in the interpretation 
of paranormal and anomalous events (Dagnall et al., 2015). On the other hand, a 
higher score on the BIS scale suggests a rational style of thinking, with a greater belief 
in science often involving the rejection of paranormal and supernatural beliefs (Farias 
et al., 2013) and therefore a rejection of the intuitive thinking style often paired with 
belief in the paranormal (Irwin, 2009; Pennycook et al., 2012; Stanovich and West, 
1998). This is further supported by Aarnio and Lindeman (2005) who found that 
scientifically orientated medicine students held one of the lowest levels of belief in the 
paranormal, as well as students of natural science having lower levels of paranormal 
beliefs in comparison to less scientifically orientated arts and humanities students 
(Gray and Mill, 1990; Grimmer and White, 1992; Aarnio and Lindeman, 2005).   
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Perceptual Measures and Paranormal Beliefs 
 
Cognitive biases have been observed to be a factor in the formation of 
delusions (Irwin et al., 2014). Delusions are understood to be one of the principle 
foundations in the establishment of paranormal beliefs (Irwin et al., 2013). Both 
cognitive biases and delusions are said to predict the intensity of paranormal beliefs 
(Irwin et al., 2014). A substantial body of research suggests that believers in the 
paranormal have many cognitive biases that underlie their beliefs (Irwin et al., 2012b). 
Believers in the paranormal are able to be understood by the cognitive deficit 
hypothesis (Irwin, 2009) with deficits in reality testing (RT), jumping to conclusions 
(JTC) and emotion-based reasoning (EBR) being commonly observed (Irwin et al., 
2012b; Dagnall et al., 2015; Blagrove et al., 2006; Brugger and Graves, 1997; Irwin et 
al., 2012a; Irwin et al., 2014; Sappington, 1990; Drinkwater et al., 2018).  
 
Delusions are said to surface when inferences that are made do not undergo 
stringent reality testing (Langdon and Coltheart, 2000). Support for this comes from 
Drinkwater et al., (2012) with moderate to strong correlations being observed between 
RT deficits and paranormal belief. Paranormal belief scores are observed to predict 
RT deficits (Irwin, 2003). This is further reinforced by research that has found a positive 
relationship between paranormal beliefs and a proneness to RT deficits (Irwin et al., 
2012b; Dagnall et al., 2015), thus highlighting the important role that deficits in RT has 
in the formation and maintenance of paranormal beliefs (Irwin, 2003; 2004). Per 
contra, Irwin et al., (2012b) found EBR to be the greatest predictor of paranormal 
belief, but in later work found that RT was the greatest predictor of paranormal belief 
with EBR yielding a much smaller correlation (Irwin et al., 2013); thus creating 
confusion around the relationship between RT and belief in the paranormal.  
 
Another cognitive bias said to be key in the formation of delusions is jumping to 
conclusions, which refers to the tendency to create an assumption on a limited amount 
of information (Irwin et al., 2014). Reinforced by empirical evidence, a relationship 
between a proneness to JTC and traditional paranormal beliefs has been observed 
(Blagrove et al., 2006; Brugger and Graves, 1997; Irwin et al., 2012a; Irwin et al., 
2014), especially in regards to the concepts of religion and witchcraft (Irwin et al., 
2012a; Irwin et al., 2014).  This finding is mirrored by Dagnall et al., (2014) who noted 
that JTC is found to be associated with paranormal belief. However, large amounts of 
scientific research fail to focus solely on the relationship between JTC and paranormal 
belief as a majority of the research often explores how JTC and delusions are linked 
instead. In spite of this, the relationship between JTC and belief in the paranormal is 
difficult to fully understand. Irwin et al., (2014) also suggests that paranormal beliefs 
may not be linked with JTC but instead are linked more specifically to an individuals’ 
awareness to make impulsive decisions.  Irwin et al., (2014) proposes that instead of 
considering implicit cognitive styles as being a key characteristic in paranormal belief, 
a consciously affected attitude should instead be considered. This is because an 
individual may rather go with their gut feeling which in this context would be 
paranormal belief, than become bogged down in rational analyses that are tedious in 
nature (Irwin et al., 2014; Irwin and Young, 2002).  
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Emotion-based reasoning (EBR) is a cognitive bias that refers to the tendency 
to choose inferences that are not of a rational nature but instead are emotionally 
appealing and is an observed factor thought to predict the intensity of paranormal 
belief (Irwin et al., 2012b). Earlier research from Sappington (1990) found that 
participants with higher EBR were more likely to have interpreted phenomena as 
paranormal. This is reinforced by more recent empirical research from Irwin et al., 
(2012b) who found the biggest predictor of belief in the paranormal to be EBR, noting 
that the general population, excluding those who are objectively orientated, hold 
paranormal beliefs because they are emotionally appealing instead of their rationality. 
This sentiment is also echoed by recent work from Drinkwater et al., (2018) who 
demonstrated a positive correlation between EBR and belief in the paranormal in a 
study of 248 participants.  However, despite the large amount of research supporting 
the relationship between EBR and paranormal belief, Irwin et al., (2012b) notes that 
the effect sizes in his study are not large by any means and so suggests that the role 
of cognitive deficits in the formation of paranormal beliefs should not be 
overemphasised. Irwin et al., (2012b) also goes on to state that despite the 
considerable role that EBR plays in paranormal belief, the roles of other types of 
reasoning should not be overlooked.  
 
Belief in science is characterised by a rational thinking style (Aarnio and 
Lindeman, 2007), which largely contrasts the intuitive thinking style that is associated 
with paranormal belief. According to many large scale surveys, it is thought that around 
80% of the adult population hold a belief in and trust in science, partially due to the 
contribution that science has towards the quality of life and the economy (Irwin et al., 
2016). It has been noted that attitudes towards science are linked to paranormal belief 
in the general population with a satisfactory body of research establishing a negative 
correlation between the two variables (Morier and Keeports, 1994; Aarnio and 
Lindeman, 2005). This can be understood through the view that supernatural 
(paranormal) beliefs and science are opposing ideologies (Dawkins, 2006).  Believers 
in paranormal phenomena have been found to disregard scientific values by adopting 
a more intuitive thinking style that accepts ideas because of the emotional appeal they 
hold, rather than scrutinising the ideas and considering alternative views (Irwin et al., 
2016). Despite this being said, paranormal belief and science have been suggested 
to have the ability to coexist in the mind (Rosengren and Gutiérrez, 2011), disputing 
the findings put forward by the research discussed earlier.  
 
Rationale, Aims and Hypotheses 
 
The rationale behind the present study is driven by a lack of research 
surrounding the relationship between thinking styles and specific facets of paranormal 
belief. Lindeman and Aarnio (2006) suggest that different paranormal beliefs may 
have different correlates with rational and intuitive thinking styles, thus providing a 
framework for the present study to build on. Furthermore, a lot of the literature 
surrounding JTC is discussed in regard to delusions and schizophrenia, not in regards 
to paranormal belief. Although delusions are thought to be a foundation for the 
formation of paranormal beliefs (Irwin et al., 2013), a substantial body of scientific 
literature does not exist that links paranormal belief and delusions together with 
thinking styles, making it unclear of the relationship that delusions have with 
paranormal belief. This makes existing literature difficult to apply within the context of 
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the present study due to this lack of clarification, thus providing further ground for the 
present study to take place.   
The current study therefore aims to investigate the relationship between thinking 
styles (rational versus intuitive) and paranormal belief, as well as looking at the 
extent of the relationship held. The study then aims to go into greater specificity by 
looking at the relationship between the individual facets of paranormal beliefs with 
thinking styles. Past research has found a positive relationship between thinking 
styles and paranormal beliefs and thus it is hypothesized that in the present study 
there will be a positive relationship between paranormal belief and intuitive thinking 
styles as measured by the cognitive-perceptual measures. In contrast, a negative 
correlation will be found between paranormal belief and rational thinking styles as 
measured by the BIS scale. Correlations between thinking style and separate facets 
of paranormal belief are also expected to be observed. 
 
Methodology 
 
Design 
 
The current study adopted a non-experimental correlational design to 
investigate the relationships between thinking styles and paranormal beliefs. The 
predictor variables were “reality testing”, “emotion-based reasoning”, “jumping to 
conclusions” and “belief in science.” The criterion variable was “paranormal belief.” 
 
Participants 
 
Two hundred and seventy-eight participants took part in this research project. 
There were 63 males with a mean age of 28.10 years (SD = 12.16), ranging between 
18 and 57 years old; and 215 females with a mean age of 25.57 years (SD = 10.77), 
ranging between 18 and 64 years. The overall mean age of the sample was 26.14 
years (SD = 11.13), ranging between 18 and 64 years old.  
 
Participants were randomly recruited through convenience sampling, allowing 
anyone over age 18 to take part in the study as it did not require the study of a specific 
demographic. Additionally, a snowball sampling technique was used in which 
participants recruited through opportunity sampling were encouraged to pass the 
questionnaire on to family and friends. In regards to the sample size, the minimum 
number of participants as recommended by Cohen (1992) is 67, whilst Brace et al., 
(1996) recommended a minimum of 100 participants when carrying out a multiple 
regression; thus the sample size is more than ample. 
 
Data collection materials 
 
Multiple scales were used in order to investigate predictor variables which were 
then combined to create one questionnaire battery (see appendix 2). Questions that 
measured the demographic background of participants such as age and gender were 
also included. Details of each of the measures included in the questionnaire are listed 
below: 
 
The Cognitive Biases Questionnaire for Psychosis (CBQp; Peters et al., 2010) 
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The CBQp consists of thirty statements that cover two themes of ‘anomalous 
perception’ and ‘threatening events.’ Each group of statements covers five different 
cognitive biases, these are: intentionalising; catastrophising, dichotomous thinking; 
jumping to conclusions and emotion-based reasoning. The items are rated on a three-
point scale and consist of statements such as ‘imagine you applied for a job and did 
not get it.’ Participants indicated their response on what they’re most likely to think out 
of the three answers (A, B or C), which have a correlating score that measures the 
extent to which their response represents a certain cognitive bias. For the purpose of 
this study, only twelve of the thirty statements in the CBQp were used, six of these 
measured jumping to conclusions and the other six measured emotion-based 
reasoning. Internal reliability for the CBQp was good (α = .89; Peters et al., 2010).  
 
Inventory of Personality Organization (IPO-RT; Lezenweger et al., 2001) 
The Reality Testing subscale of the IPO was the chosen scale to measure 
reality testing. The IPO-RT is made up of statements such as ‘When I’m nervous or 
confused, it seems like things in the outside world don’t make sense either’ and ‘I have 
seen things that do not exist in reality.’ Participants rated each item on a 5-point Likert 
scale (1 = never true to 5 = always true) to indicate the extent to which they agreed 
with the statement. Internal consistency of the IPO-RT was found to be excellent (α = 
.92; Drinkwater et al., 2012).  
 
The Belief in Science Questionnaire (BIS; Farias et al., 2013) 
The BIS Questionnaire is a 10-item scale that comprises of items addressing 
individual’s ideas around science. The BIS is made up of items such as ‘science is the 
most valuable part of human culture’ and ‘all the tasks that human beings face are 
soluble by science.’ Participants rated each item on a 6-point Likert scale (1= strongly 
disagree to 6 = strongly agree) to show how much they agreed with each statement. 
Internal reliability for this scale was good (α = .86; Farias et al., 2013). 
Manchester Metropolitan University New (MMU-N) 
  The MMU-N is a 64-item scale which is complied of 8 paranormal facets 
(hauntings, superstitions, religion, ESP, PK, astrology, witchcraft and alien visitation) 
extracted by Dagnall et al., (2010a, 2010b). The MMU-N is made up of items such as 
‘there is a devil’ and ‘there are actual cases of witchcraft’ in which the participant marks 
their response on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree). 
The MMU-N possess a good to excellent external reliability (Dagnall et al., 2010a).  
Procedure 
An information sheet and a consent form were read by the participant prior to 
completion of the online questionnaire. Once consent was obtained, the participant 
was asked to complete the online questionnaire composed of the above scales and 
were asked to be as open and honest with their answers as possible, as well as not 
dwelling on one single question for too long a period. Upon completion, participants 
were then thanked and debriefed and then asked to create a unique personal code 
that makes their data set identifiable by the researcher should they want to withdraw 
their data from the study prior to the commencement of data analysis. Once the 
required amount of responses was reached, the data was entered into a spreadsheet 
and then transferred over to SPSS to enable the researcher to conduct the data 
analyses.  
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Ethical considerations 
The ethical considerations for this research project were in line with the British 
Psychological Society’s (BPS) ethical guidelines (BPS, 2009; see appendix 1). The 
study was seen unlikely to have a negative affect on participants well-being or health, 
partly due to its non-invasive nature. Prior to participation, consenting participants 
were made aware of the aims of the study and reminded of their right to withdraw at 
any point. Upon completion of the questionnaire, participants were debriefed and 
given the opportunity to create a unique code to enable them to withdraw at a later 
point before data analysis commenced. Participants were also provided with contact 
details for the researcher and the research supervisor should they have any questions 
regarding the study. Information about the participants was stored on a password 
protected computer as well as the details being kept anonymous and confidential 
throughout the data handling process.  
Results 
 
Descriptive statistics and reliability analysis 
Scale internal reliability was conducted prior to the analyses and descriptive statistics 
were produced accordingly (see Table 1).  
 
Table 1. Cognitive-Perceptual, Belief in Science and Paranormal Belief Measures 
Descriptives 
      M  SD  Min  Max α 
  Cognitive-
Perceptual 
     
Reality Testing 45.39 15.61 20.00 100.00 .92 
JTC 10.48 2.15 7.00 17.00 .55 
EBR 8.01 2.19 6.00 18.00 .68 
Belief in Science   39.84 11.81 10.00 60.00 .92 
Paranormal Belief 211.84 72.88 64.00 430.00  
Hauntings 30.76 14.80 8.00 56.00 .97 
Superstition 30.55 10.75 8.00 56.00 .82 
Religion 30.14 12.85 8.00 56.00 .90 
ESP 31.56 11.82 8.00 56.00 .92 
Psychokinesis 19.04 9.82 8.00 55.00 .91 
Astrology 22.98 11.56 8.00 56.00 .91 
Witchcraft 24.92 12.78 8.00 56.00 .93 
Aliens 21.90 13.80 8.00 56.00 .97 
Internal consistencies for most of the cognitive-perceptual measures were 
ideal. ‘Reality testing’ showed an excellent reliability (α = .92), whilst ‘emotion based 
reasoning’ had a questionable internal consistency of α = .68. The only cognitive-
perceptual measure that did not have an ideal internal consistency was the ‘jumping 
to conclusions’ measure which had poor reliability (α = .55). The internal consistency 
for the belief in science scale was found to be excellent (α = .92). Good internal 
reliability was found for the ‘superstition’ measure (α = .87) of the MMU-N scale and 
excellent reliability for the other 7 measures of MMU-N scale was found, ranging 
between α = .90 and .97.  
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Correlations between Cognitive-Perceptual measures, Belief in Science and 
Paranormal Belief 
 
Pearson’s correlations were computed for the paranormal belief, cognitive-
perceptual measures and belief in science (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2. Paranormal Belief, Cognitive-Perceptual Measures and Belief in Science 
Inter-Scale Correlations 
 1 2 3 4 5 
1. RT      
2. JTC .42**     
3. EBR .51** .53**    
4. BIS -.17** -.19** -.30**   
5. PB .46** .34** .44** -.42**  
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).  
 
Significant positive correlations are observable between each of the cognitive 
perceptual measures (RT, JTC and EBR) as well as with PB. A positive correlation 
can be seen between RT and JTC, r(276) = .42, p < .001. Positive correlations can 
also be seen between EBR and RT, r(276) = .51, p < .001, as well as between PB and 
RT, r(276) = .46, p < .001. Furthermore, both EBR (r(276) = .53, p < .001) and PB 
(r(276) = .34, p < .001) positively correlated with JTC.  
 
PB also was found to positively correlate with EBR, r(276) = .44, p < .001. BIS 
negatively correlated with all measures: negatively correlating with RT (r(276) = -.17, 
p < .001); JTC (r(276) = -.19, p < .001); EBR (r(276) = -.30, p < .001) and PB (r(276) 
= -.42, p < .001).  
 
Relationships between Individual Facets of Paranormal Belief, Cognitive-
Perceptual measures and Belief in Science 
 
Pearson’s correlations were computed for facets of PB, cognitive-perceptual 
measures and BIS (see Table 3).  
 
Table 3. Relations between facets of paranormal belief, cognitive-perceptual factors 
and belief in science 
                    Cognitive-Perceptual 
  RT JTC EBR  BIS 
Ghosts .37** .27** .36** -.31** 
Superstition .26** .25** .23** -.13* 
Religion .23** .21** .28** -.57** 
ESP .41** .22** .38** -.35** 
PK .46** .20** .34** -.34** 
Astrology .42** .34** .46** -.31** 
Witchcraft  .36** .32** .40** -.44** 
Aliens .27** .21** .19** -.06 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed); * Correlation is significant at 
the 0.05 level (1-tailed).  
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Belief in ghosts positively correlated with RT (r(276) = .37, p < .001); JTC 
(r(276) = .27, p < .001) and EBR (r(276) = .36, p < .001), but negatively correlated with 
BIS, r(276) = -.31, p < .001. Furthermore, ESP positively correlated with all cognitive-
perceptual measures: RT (r(276) = .41, p < .001); JTC (r(276) = .22, p < .001) and 
EBR (r(276) = .38, p < .001), whilst negatively correlating with BIS, r(276) = -.57, p < 
.001. 
  PK correlations reported similar positive correlations with RT (r(276) = .46, p < 
.001); JTC (r(276) = .20, p < .001); and EBR (r(276) = .34, p < .001), whilst negatively 
correlating with BIS, r(276) = -.34, p < .001. Significant positive correlations were also 
observed between astrology and cognitive-perceptual measures: RT (r(276) = .42, p 
< .001); JTC (r(276) = .34, p < .001); and EBR (r(276) = .46, p < .001) and between 
witchcraft and cognitive-perceptual measures: RT (r(276) = .36, p < .001); JTC (r(276) 
= .32, p < .001); and EBR, r(276) = .40, p < .001. Astrology negatively correlated with 
BIS, r(276) = -.31, p < .001, as did witchcraft and BIS, r(276) = -.44, p < .001.  
 
Differentiating from the above paranormal facets, superstition was observed to 
only hold weak positive correlations with all of the cognitive-perceptual measures: RT 
(r(276) = .26, p < .001); JTC (r(276) = .25, p < .001) and EBR (r(276) = .23, p < .001), 
whilst showing a very weak negative correlation with BIS, r(276) = -.13, p = 0.05. Weak 
positive correlations were found between religion and cognitive-perceptual measures: 
RT (r(276) = .23, p < .001); JTC (r(276) = .21, p < .001); and EBR (r(276) = .28, p < 
.001) and had a moderate negative correlation with BIS, r(276) = -.57, p < .001. As 
expected, aliens showed the weakest positive correlations with cognitive-perceptual 
measures: the correlations with RT, r(276) = .27, p < .001, and JTC, r(276) = .21, p < 
.001 were weak and the correlation with EBR was very weak, r(276) = .19, p < .001. 
No significant correlation was observed between aliens and BIS.  
 
Factors predicting Paranormal Belief 
 
A multiple regression analysis was performed in order to see the extent to which 
RT, JTC, EBR and BIS were predictors of PB amongst the sample. The tests for 
collinearity found that the data set met the assumption of no multicollinearity as all 
variables where within tolerance. Through use of the ‘enter’ method a significant model 
was found, F(4,273) = 39.33, p < .001 (see table 4).  
 
Table 4. Summary of regression analysis for predicting paranormal belief scores 
Variable B SE B 
(std. 
Error) 
β (beta 
score) 
t Sig. 
Constant 157.45 24.79  6.35 .000 
RT 1.40 .27 .30** 5.25 .000 
JTC 2.41 1.98 .07 1.22 .224 
EBR 5.26 2.09 .16* 2.52 .012 
BIS -1.93 -.31 -.31** -6.17 .000 
R2 = .36      
* indicates p < .05; ** indicates p <.001 
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A strong relationship was observed (R = .61) with the model able to explain 
approximately 36.6% (R 2adj = 35.6%) of the variance in the paranormal belief scores. 
The strongest predictor of paranormal belief was found to be RT, β = .30, t(273) = 
5.26, p < .001. Additionally, EBR was a predictor of paranormal belief, β = .16, t(273) 
= 2.52, p = .012. Belief in Science was a significant negative predictor of paranormal 
belief, β = -.31, t(273) = -6.17, p < .001. The contributions of the predictor variables to 
paranormal beliefs are detailed in Table 4. 
 
  Overall, the results indicate that the most significant predictor of paranormal 
beliefs was reality testing. Emotion-based reasoning was also a significant predictor 
of paranormal belief. Belief in Science negatively predicted paranormal belief whilst 
jumping to conclusions was found to be a non-significant predictor.  
 
Discussion 
 
The present study examined the relationship between thinking styles and 
paranormal belief, before going into further specificity and looking at how thinking 
styles correlate with separate facets of paranormal beliefs. In relation to the 
hypotheses, the results of the present study demonstrated support for the relationship 
between thinking styles and paranormal belief. Further regression analyses illustrated 
a positive correlation between intuitive thinking styles and paranormal belief, meaning 
the greater belief in the paranormal participants held, the more likely they were to 
score higher on the cognitive-perceptual measures. These findings reaffirm findings 
from past research that have also highlighted a positive relationship between intuitive 
thinking styles and a greater belief in the paranormal (Lindeman and Aarnio, 2006; 
Pennycook et al., 2012; Irwin, 2009; Stanovich and West, 1998).  
 
Of all the cognitive-perceptual measures, RT was revealed to be the strongest 
predictor in paranormal belief and as predicted, paranormal belief positively correlated 
with the other cognitive-perceptual measures: EBR and JTC, but to a lesser extent 
than RT. Further to this, RT being the best predictor of paranormal beliefs mirrors 
findings from Irwin (2003, 2004) who similarly to the present study noted the important 
role that RT deficits hold in the formation of paranormal beliefs. Despite the positive 
correlation observed between RT and paranormal belief, the strength of the effect size 
(r = .46) only demonstrates a moderate positive correlation between the variables 
(Evans, 1996), and so forth the observed relationship is not overly compelling. The 
same can be said with the positive correlations between JTC (r = .34) and EBR (r = 
.44) with paranormal belief, as the strength of the relationships between the variables 
ranges between weak and moderate (Evans, 1996).  
 
Also as predicted, BIS negatively correlated with paranormal belief and so this 
finding is coherent with past research that has also observed a negative relationship 
between the two variables (Morier and Keeports, 1994; Aarnio and Lindeman, 2005). 
Furthermore, BIS was found to negatively correlate with the cognitive-perceptual 
measures; RT, EBR and JTC but the correlations observed ranged between weak to 
very weak (Evans, 1996). Likewise, the relationship between BIS and paranormal 
belief was that of a moderate negative correlation and so again the strength of this 
relationship is questionable and is not overly compelling.  
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Fairly similar significant positive correlations were observed between all of the 
cognitive-perceptual measures and the individual facets of paranormal belief with the 
exception of religion and aliens; which despite being significant held weak correlations 
with measures of cognitive-perception. RT was the greatest predictor of all the 
paranormal facets, excluding religion, out of all of the cognitive-perceptual measures. 
In contrast, BIS held consistent negative correlations across the separate facets of 
paranormal belief as predicted. The only non-significant relationship observed in the 
entire study was the correlation between BIS and belief in aliens.  
 
When looking at the separate facets of paranormal belief, the highest 
correlation was held between PK and RT as well as between astrology and EBR (r = 
.46). The present study found conforming evidence for the idea that science and 
religion cannot coexist in an individual’s mind as the strongest negative correlation 
was observed between RT and BIS (r = -.57), thus lending support to the findings from 
Rosengren and Gutiérrez, (2011). Only one non-significant correlation can be 
observed in the present study and so there is a substantial amount of support for the 
study’s hypotheses. Nonetheless, the lack of strength in the correlations observed 
between the cognitive-perceptual measures and BIS with the individual facets of 
paranormal belief should be considered as they range from very weak to moderate 
(Evans, 1996), ergo the lack of strength between the relationships needs to be 
investigated in greater depth before drawing any firm conclusions about the extent to 
which thinking styles predict paranormal belief and its facets.  
 
The present study has been successfully able to demonstrate that there is a 
relationship between thinking styles and paranormal belief, but the study does indeed 
have limitations that need to be taken into consideration. As discussed earlier, there 
is a lack of strength in regards to the relationships between the variables, therefore 
meaning we cannot draw solid conclusions in regards to how thinking styles predict 
paranormal belief. The measures used to measure thinking style, (CBQp and BIS) can 
be criticised as they are proxy measures. This means that these scales were not 
initially created to measure thinking styles and so we can only infer that the responses 
participants give are representative of either an intuitive or rational thinking style; firm 
conclusions cannot be drawn. The measures used are also considered to be multi-
dimensional and so may measure some concepts, for example, certain facets of 
paranormal belief more than they measure some of the other facets.    
    
           The present study made use of an online battery of questionnaires in which the 
participant fills in themselves. The self-report data yielded may contain social 
desirability bias that could have affected participants’ responses due to them 
answering in a way that they think the researcher and others would view in a 
favourable light. This poses a problem as a self-report measure may not present us 
with a true insight into an individuals’ thoughts and feelings in regard to their belief in 
the paranormal and in turn will have affected the results. Furthermore, the battery of 
questionnaires may have affected the data due to its length nature. The first scale in 
the questionnaire, the MMU-N scale, consisted of 64-items and was then followed 
subsequently by the other three scales. This could have led to participant fatigue or a 
lack of interest in the study. Participant fatigue can be problematic as they are able to 
become unengaged from the survey which could lead to participants choosing random 
answers or engaging in straight-line responding. This is where participants choose 
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multiple answers down the same column on the survey; especially at later stages in 
survey participation.  
 
In order to recruit participants to take part in the present study, convenience 
sampling was the recruitment method of choice. Although this method allows the 
researcher to gather a large number of participants at once due to the fact it is not 
used to study a specific demographic, it can be problematic as it can be criticised for 
sampling bias. This is where the sample is not representative of the entire population 
as the researcher has not been able to intentionally recruit participants from different 
cultures, countries, ethnicities and other individual differences that may have an affect 
on the results. Although it is possible that this recruitment method may have gathered 
participants from different backgrounds, the researcher cannot be sure of this due to 
the anonymity that participants are entitled to. This leads to a problem in making 
generalisations and inferences about the results in regards to the entire population, 
thus resulting in a low external validity. The gender ratio of the participants in this study 
is also problematic in regards to generalisation of the results to the male population 
due to the overwhelming amount of female (N = 215) to male (N = 63) participants. 
This too can be said about the mean age of participants (26.14 years) with this 
meaning the results may be difficult to generalise to an older generation as they are 
seemingly under-represented in this sample. 
 
The findings from the present study provide us with an understanding of how 
thinking styles affect belief in the paranormal and why some individuals are more 
prone to holding such beliefs. This has an implication for further research to be carried 
out as it highlights the need for a further understanding of the relationships that are 
held; especially in regards to the individual facets of paranormal belief. The findings 
from this research also implicate how we can apply scientific knowledge to paranormal 
belief, a topic that upon first glance seems to be the polar opposite to scientific 
knowledge and its principles. Not only this, but research within this area is able to 
broaden our worldview and creates ground for further scientific endeavours to be 
carried out in an area of psychology which is less well researched. 
 
Further research should consider looking further into the relationships between 
the separate facets of paranormal belief and thinking styles due to the large gap that 
exists in this area of psychological research. Copious amounts of scientific research 
tend to focus heavily on Western cultures and their beliefs in the paranormal whilst 
failing to acknowledge that other cultures may demonstrate completely different 
beliefs. To overcome this, a larger, more representative sample should be obtained in 
future studies, ensuring recruitment of many participants from differing backgrounds, 
as although the present study had an adequate sample, it lacked representativeness 
in regards to culture, age and other individual differences that may influence the 
outcome of the results in a study. By doing this, generalisations and inferences about 
the findings can be more easily made.  
 
To conclude, the findings from the present study have contributed to the 
existing literature surrounding this research area by using previous findings as a 
framework before expanding on these to obtain a greater understanding about the 
relationship that is observed between thinking styles and paranormal belief. Expansion 
on earlier research has been achieved by the present study going into greater 
specificity and looking at the relationships between the individual facets of paranormal 
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belief and then how these then correlate with thinking styles. No previous literature 
has seemed to focus on this specific of a link and so much more research is needed 
within the topic area in order to close the gap in the existing literature and allow clearer 
comprehension of this association in a more thorough manner.    
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